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Insufficient integration between investment and human rights law is a concern recurrently being 
raised about the investment regime. However, the UNCITRAL debate on investor-state dispute-
settlement (ISDS) reform focuses on procedural aspects. This concern is therefore an elephant in the 
room, where counterclaims by respondent countries are the only connected topic indirectly touched 
upon at the moment.1  
 
Permitting free-standing counterclaims (namely, counterclaims relying on the same factual matrix of 
the original claims, but grounded in different legal bases than the international investment agreements 
(IIAs) themselves) would contribute to rebalancing IIAs’ asymmetrical character. Such 
counterclaims, as opposed to defensive counterclaims, would allow tribunals to take a holistic 
approach to disputes, and to adjudicate, alongside countries’ breaches of IIAs, the consequences of 
investors’ non-compliance with human rights obligations. This would promote “procedural 
efficiency, fairness, and the rule of law.”2  
 
Countries’ ability to file free-standing counterclaims depends on specific procedural and substantive 
provisions. Absent such provisions, counterclaims legally unrelated to investors’ claims of treaty 
breach, but factually connected therewith, are inadmissible. Exceptions occur either when parties 
have entered into a related specific agreement3 or, as in Urbaser and Aven, ISDS clauses allow either 
investors or countries to resort to ISDS. However, even in the above cases, counterclaims have been 
dismissed. The very same argument justifying counterclaims’ admissibility—that “it can no longer 
be admitted that companies operating internationally are immune from becoming subjects of 
international law,”4 including human rights obligations—is the main factor causing their dismissal: 
the nature of human rights obligations as inter-state primary obligations makes it impossible to merely 
shift them from countries to corporations.5 
 
Thus, based on the argument that corporations are subjects of international law with human rights 
obligations, counterclaims have been rather inoperative until now. Whether physical and legal 
persons are objects—or, rather, subjects—of international law is a traditional distinction “not 
particularly helpful, either intellectually or operationally,”6 as the domestic jurisprudence of different 
countries—often contradictory on this point—demonstrates.7 
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To promote international justice, countries’ right to counterclaim should be given a tangible legal 
basis, going beyond foreign investors’ general duty to respect host countries’ laws and the putative 
inadmissibility of their ISDS claims in case of breach thereof. This innovation would contribute to 
better integration of investment and human rights law, especially if legislation on human rights 
protection from corporate abuses is contextually established by both home and host countries. This 
objective is now being pursued by a UN treaty project “to regulate, in international human rights law, 
the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”8  
 
The draft treaty covers all business activities, domestic and transnational (art. 3), and requires 
countries to prevent and address human rights violations of enterprises, domestically and abroad. 
Such an approach, covering, without distinction, domestic and transnational corporate human rights 
abuses, is very promising. Pursuant to the project, home and host state parties shall regulate 
effectively the activities of business enterprises within their territories or jurisdictions, including their 
transnational activities, and require them to establish human rights due diligence processes, i.e., 
mechanisms that identify, assess, prevent, and monitor any actual or potential human rights violations 
that may arise from corporate business activities (art. 5). Moreover, state parties shall establish 
systems of legal liability (either criminal, civil or administrative) for human rights violations 
occurring in the context of business activities (art. 6) and effective mechanisms for the enforcement 
of national or foreign judgments or awards in this field. They might also require business operators 
to maintain financial guarantees to cover victims’ potential claims of compensation, and give victims 
the possibility to choose among different fora for filing their claims: home and host country courts, 
alongside country-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms (art. 4.8). Finally, other agreements 
(including IIAs) shall be compatible and interpreted in accordance with this treaty (art. 12.6). 
 
Alleged grave violations of human rights by MNEs in host countries are recurring events. Against 
this backdrop, the possible interplay between free-standing counterclaims and the above 
developments deserves the utmost consideration, in light of its positive contribution to human rights’ 
effective compliance by home and host countries and national and multinational enterprises. 
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